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Metanational Learning in TFT-LCD Industry: 










Japan’s dominance in TFT-LCD production share has weakened over time, while Korea 
and Taiwan have taken over the leading positions.  After reviewing conventional wisdom 
regarding the factors influencing the decline in Japan’s production volume, we reframe 
the entire issue from the perspective of “metanational” learning.  Success behind Korean 
and Taiwanese firms lies in the fact that they have adopted the metanational approach: 
learning knowledge from Japan and adopting the global best-supplier policy for 
equipment and materials, regardless of nationality (e.g. Samsung).  We argue that the 
relevance of the metanational approach (as opposed to the domestic “black box” 
approach) is determined by the competitive advantage of home country/industry and 
company.  While this approach is generally considered appropriate for firms that are 
trying to overcome their home country disadvantages, we argue that the metanational 
approach remains appropriate for firms which need to cope with eroding country and 
industry competitiveness, such as Japanese firms in the TFT-LCD industry.  
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1. History and background 
 
Japan enjoyed early dominance – 95% or more market share – when the high volume, 
large format industry launched in 1990.  Since then, Japan’s dominance in market share 
has weakened over time, with Korea and then Taiwan gaining parity and then vying for 
leadership.  In the same period, no appreciable production volume emerged in the U.S.  
Japan lost momentum; its market share plummeted to less than 15%.  Both Korea and 
Taiwan have gained a market share as high as around 40% each.  What is the explanation 
for this turn of events, which many find surprising? 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the trend of national market shares, 1993-2005. 
--- insert figure 1 about here --- 
 
There are various explanations within industry and academia, all of which may contain a 
certain amount of truth.  We will show in this paper that a critical aspect of the problem 
has been overlooked, in particular, a knowledge-based perspective.  And if we don’t take 
such a view, public and corporate policy responses to global technology/innovation 
diffusion currently under discussion in Japan as well as many other countries could take a 
serious wrong turn, much as U.S. policy toward the TFT industry did in the 1990s. 
 
We first look at different explanations of the factors influencing a decline in Japan’s 
leadership, at least in terms of production volume.  To do this, we summarize 
conventional wisdom in the industry, and present an alternative view by drawing on a 




2. Why Japan declined: Conventional wisdom 
   4
In this section, various explanations of Japan’s decline in market share are offered, 
largely based on conventional wisdom: 
 
2.1.  Japan’s recession 
 
Japanese companies lost their nerve during the Asian financial crisis because they did not 
have sufficient capital and thought industry too risky.  They decided to relocate 
downstream (manufacturing) to low-cost Asian countries.  No third-generation fab 
investments were made after Sharp and Display Technologies Incorporated (DTI), the 
IBM-Toshiba manufacturing alliance, followed by Hitachi’s Gen. 3.5.  Diversification of 
Japan’s large electronics companies in the ’80s impeded decision-making, as quite a few 
senior managers – or so-called salarii-man keieisha (salaried managers) – often cannot 
understand all of the businesses in their charge.  Japan’s notorious consensus orientation, 
as opposed to the more centralized decision-making in Taiwanese and Korean firms, 
slowed the pace of generational changes and outstripped abilities of Japanese firms to 
make decisions to allocate the huge resources needed to build new fabs.  Taiwan and 
Korean firms had better access to capital: because of giant chaebol for Korea, and loose 
equity markets for Taiwan.  Japanese companies may also have been concerned by the 
continuing evolution of alternative technologies, especially PDP, which could compete 
with TFT for the future flat-panel TV market. 
 
 
2.2. Oligopolistic reaction vis-à-vis the Taiwanese market 
 
Korean firms emerged as close followers to Sharp, DTI, and Hitachi in implementing 3G 
technology when no Japanese companies would follow.  They built capabilities on the 
“Seoul Express” of weekend moonlighting Japanese scientists.  Japanese producers 
responded by aggressively, intentionally transferring technology to Taiwanese firms.   
Mitsubishi Group member ADI, a joint FPD production venture between Asahi Glass and 
Mitsubishi (Murtha et al. 2001), was among the first, choosing, because of the lack of 
capital, to sponsor 3G in Taiwan in collaboration with Chunghwa Picture Tubes (CPT)   5
rather than build in Japan.  It trained many Taiwanese operators and engineers at the 
facilities in Japan.  Japanese companies had been resisting technology transfer with 
Taiwan until then.  But once ADI moved in 1999, everyone rushed to follow.   
 
The whole trend was triggered by the Asian financial crisis:  IMF financial crisis in 1998 
made Korean firms to secure sufficient financial resource.  Mass-production of TFT-LCD 
by Korean firms lowered the price, which made the Korean product price-competitive 
and penetrated the Taiwanese market.  Japanese firms’ market share in Taiwan 
plummeted.  Korean-made DRAM also penetrated Taiwan at that time.  Japanese firms, 
including Mitsubishi, Toshiba, IBM Japan, Sharp, and Matsushita, were forced to start 
producing TFT-LCD locally, and transferred technologies to local partners. 
 
Transferred labor and knowledge from related industries also facilitated Taiwan’s surge: 
experience from the foundry business in the semiconductor industry was useful for 
enhancing its manufacturing capability; upgrading manufacturing knowledge, from OEM 
to ODM, then to EMS; extended know-how gained by the semiconductor industry, which 
is useful and applicable to the early phase of TFT-LCD; and migration of capable people 
from the semiconductor to the TFT-LCD industry due to recession in 2001 was also 
helpful (Shintaku 2006). 
 
 
2.3. Strategic intent of Korean and Taiwanese firms 
 
Taiwanese and Korean firms took a bold risk by entering during industry downturns 
within the crystal cycle, because resources become available for the challengers in these 
downturns (Mathews 2005:21).   
 
“A firm that targets the industry will utilize the first available downturn to acquire 
the technology and the technological capabilities – as Korean firms Samsung and 
LG did during the first downturn in the FPD industry in 1993-94.  They hired 
Japanese engineers who had been made redundant and set up R&D Centers in   6
Japan to take advantage of the circulation of resources and knowledge that the 
downturn unleashed.  Then they waited for the next downturn to launch their 
attack by mounting massive investments in 1995-96.  Correspondingly, the 
Taiwanese firms were building their capabilities during this second downturn and 
succeeded in negotiating technology transfer from the Japanese firms as they cut 
back on investment during the third downturn in 1997-98, at which point the 
Taiwanese ramped up their own investments.  During the fourth downturn in 2001, 
new Taiwanese entrants made their mark, making bets on variants of the 
fundamental TFT-LCD technology” (Mathews 2005:21-22). 
 
Such a strategy is only effective for the new entrants as downturns would provide them 
with a small “window of opportunity” for raising investment while the incumbents cannot 
do so (Mathews 2005:22). 
 
 
2.4. Independent moves by Japan’s equipment and materials makers 
 
Japan’s equipment and materials makers were also aggressive and “greedy” – they were 
anxious to sell their products to a wider market when Japanese firms stopped investing.  
At the same time, Japanese customers were pleased to see development costs for toolsets 
amortized over a wider range of buyers.  Equipment and materials embody a substantial 
amount of the critical knowledge necessary to start up new fabs.  Since human factors are 





2.5. National government strategies 
                                                 
1 Incidentally, equipment and especially materials makers expanded into these new 
markets by either export or FDI, thereby preserving their competitive advantages.  This 
contrasts with panel-makers who often did not invest or partner but transferred 
technology, thereby strengthening competitors, setting the stage for their own declines. 
   7
 
Korea and Taiwan’s governments played major roles, including a 4-year plan by 
Taiwan’s government-owned Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) to foster 
the FPD industry since 1993, and the ITRI’s 6-year plan to foster FPD industry since 
1997, which facilitated the rapid growth.  Actually, these roles were minimal in terms of 
financial resources, and the idea that they were important reflects the idea that 
government roles in encouraging the FPD industry were similar to the roles they may 
have played in semiconductors.
2  Repatriation incentives to overseas Taiwanese played a 
big role with regards to semiconductors, but could not happen in TFTs because there 
were few engineers in the U.S. who were experienced with the technology.  Therefore the 
impact was relatively small by comparison. 
 
At the same time, the spin-off of ITRI staff to the TFT-LCD industry contributed to the 
rapid growth of the industry (Akabane 2004, Shintaku 2006).  The spin-off project from 
ITRI was significant, and CMO was founded because of the efforts of one of the ex-ITRI 
person (Shintaku 2006);  Topply was also a spin-off of a national research institute.   
 
 
2.6. Deverticalization and outsourcing 
 
Many Japanese companies wanted to move up to concentrate on new technologies with 
supposed higher-value added, such as LTPS, and cultivated Taiwanese suppliers in 
preference to Korean suppliers as lower-cost providers for outsourcing TFT LCDs (See 
Akabane 2002).  Japanese companies were acting on a national propensity for continually 
upgrading technologies.  Cost structures in Korea and Taiwan actually were lower, with 
Taiwan the lowest (Akabane 2002).  Japanese companies also preferred to redeploy their 
advanced engineers, skilled operators, as well as financial resources to new technologies 
rather than to implementing generational transitions.   
 
                                                 
2 Alternative views are also presented, which include Wang (2003), Akabane (2002), 
Murtha et al. (2001), and Shintaku (2006).   8
 
3.  Knowledge-based view: Stepping back to leap forward 
 
All of these explanations are interesting, relevant, and capture some portion of the truth.  
But they are not sufficient to explain the phenomenon.  The missing element pertains to 
an understanding of the role of knowledge and knowledge creation in the industry, and 
the consequent critical role of collaboration in industry advancement.  The emergence of 
high-volume industry in Japan relied on global collaboration between Japanese 
companies and a set of equipment and materials manufacturers originating in Japan and 
elsewhere in the world.   
 
The high speed of industry advancement creates a knowledge codification backlog at the 
leading edge of generational transitions.  Much of the critical knowledge in the industry, 
even in lagging generations, remains tacit or constitutes a verbal tradition that depends on 
direct human social interaction for sharing, further developing, and putting to use.   
Critical knowledge is dispersed widely within the industry among producers’ experienced 
scientists, engineers, and operators, and people working within equipment and materials 
suppliers, all of whom must work together in collaborative networks to set up new 
generation fabs (Murtha et al. 2001). 
 
The process of setting up new generation fabs, particularly in the first company or two to 
lead a generational transition is complex.  These companies are essentially starting from 
nothing, as often the larger pieces of equipment may never have been fully assembled 
and tested as complete machines until the first units are set up in the new generation 
pioneering firms. 
 
This shows the relevance of stepping back to leap forward – as did the Korean and 
Taiwanese firms that built knowledge foundations for participating in the industry by 
building prior generation fabs, for which the toolsets, material characteristics, and 
manufacturing processes were well understood and well documented.  In this way, they 
gained the necessary experience – adequate learning platforms – to create the teams of   9
experienced people needed to implement leading generation fab startups, where to the 
real need is to start from scratch with line integration and process design. 
 
U.S. companies have never been willing to step back, but rather always try to leapfrog.  
This has been a problem since the beginning of the FPD industry, when U.S. firms based 
their planning on the prospects of a large, flat TV, which they soon learned would not 
happen quickly, while Japanese companies implemented the new technology for small 
calculator and watch displays.  As an example, RCA and Sharp/Seiko showed remarkably 
contrasting approaches back in the ’70s. Whereas the former was primarily interested in 
technological leapfrogging without nurturing new product potential, the latter took a 
much longer-term view in order to develop the capabilities necessary for new product 
development (Numagami 1999). 
 
There are distinctions between Taiwanese and Korean strategies. Korean companies 
continue to vie with Sharp to lead generational transitions, whereas Taiwanese companies, 
by choice, have not taken generational leads, but prefer to lag behind; an approach that 
apparently has paid off.  Taiwanese firms introduced technologies from Japanese firms, 
including: CPT from ADI (Mitsubishi), ADT (established by Acer in 1996) from IBM 
Japan, Unipac from Fujitsu (2000) MVA technology, and Unipac also from Matsushita.
3  
They chose to adopt the lagged 3G technology while Japan had 3.5G; Taiwanese 
engineers were sent to Japan to learn standard operating procedure (SOP); Japanese 
engineers also visited Taiwan to supervise the local operations.  Japanese firms had little 
concern for leaking core technologies, primarily due to the fact that they were 
transferring old-generation technologies. 
 
                                                 
3 ADT, which was established by Acer in 1996, acquired Unipac in 2001, and changed 
the name to AUO.   10
Taiwan firms preferred to lag, but not too much – AUO’s “first follower’s approach” 
equates to its not being as fast as the first movers (such as Sharp and Samsung), but 




４. Conceptual Framework 
 
4.1. Organizing mode of technological learning 
 
The mode of technological learning varies by the locus of core technologies that form the 
basis for the firms’ competitiveness.  Modes of learning employed by different 
companies vary accordingly.  Patterns are quite different by countries of origin as well.  
The Japanese pattern shows significant difference from that of Korean and Taiwanese 
firms. 
 
It is useful to think of alternative approaches in two dimensions: geographic scope and 
organizational boundary.  The former refers to the locus of value-added activities to be 
conducted in a single country vis-à-vis across national borders.  The latter refers to the 
extent of collaboration with external parties in conducting value-added activities.  
These two dimensions were adopted because they are affected by two key factors of 
industry success: geographic scope depends on a home-country’s industry 
competitiveness, whereas organizational boundary depends on firms’ core capabilities.  
Four categories can be composed based on these dimensions: 
 
---- insert table 1 about here ---- 
 
                                                 
4 Taiwan’s success implies the importance of networks as knowledge creation 
mechanisms.  Country-specific propensities for collaboration are salient in Taiwan as 
compared to Japan.  Japanese companies may have harmed themselves by trying to 
internalize too much. 
   11
We call them domestic/in-house, domestic/collaborative, international/in-house,  and 
international/collaborative respectively.  According to this framework, there are four 




4.2. Determinants of selecting a particular mode 
 
The following criteria determine the organizing mode of a firm: 1) domestic industry-
specific advantage, and 2) company-specific core technology.  
 
It is natural to assume that a company adopts the in-house approach when it enjoys 
company-specific core technology so that it attempts to buffer and isolate itself from the 
external environment (Rumelt 1991, Barney 1991, Thompson 1967); whereas the 
company resorts to inter-firm collaboration when its core technology becomes weak and 
the company needs to acquire new capability through external linkages (Gomes-Casseres 
1996); or that the company resorts to international collaboration when the home-
country’s industry-specific advantage is weak. 
 
Following such logic, the following alternatives can be drawn: 
 
1. If competency continues to reside in the home country industry and the company-
specific core technology, the company is likely to adopt the domestic/in-house approach. 
2. If competency does not reside in the home country industry or in the company’s core 
technology, the company is likely to adopt the international/collaborative approach. 
3. If competency resides in the home country’s industry but not in the company’s core 
technology, the company is likely to adopt the domestic/collaborative approach. 
4. If competency resides in the company’s core technology but not in the home country’s 
industry, the company is likely to adopt the international/in-house approach 
 
---- insert table 2 about here ----   12
 
4.3. Metanational approach 
 
The emergence and evolution of the TFT-LCD industry in the East Asian region is 
characterized as the process of “metanational” learning (Doz et al. 2001, Murtha et al. 
2001).  According to Doz et al. (2001), metanational companies “view the world as a 
global canvas dotted with pockets of technology, market intelligence, and capabilities.  
They see untapped potential in these pockets of specialist knowledge scattered around the 
world.  By sensing and mobilizing this scattered knowledge, they are able to innovate 
more effectively than their rivals” (Doz et al. 2001:5).  A dominant TFT-LCD 
manufacturing paradigm emerged in the mid-’90s through competition and collaboration 
among global firms with organizational capabilities in Japan.  Due to the rapid 
technology evolution which created a knowledge codification backlog, intense 
interpersonal contact among and within companies remained critical (Murtha and 
Lenway 2006). 
 
While many US firms were reluctant to establish learning relationships with Asia due to 
their attachment to the US government’s R&D subsidies (Murtha et al. 2001), some firms 
like Applied Materials, IBM, and Corning did not rely on US government programs and 
developed close relations with customers and suppliers in Japan (Murtha et al. 2001, 
Murtha and Lenway 2006).  These companies remain the major players in this industry 
today, largely because of their metanational learning approach: tapping into the hotbed of 
innovation (i.e. Japan at that time) to overcome their home-country disadvantages (Doz et 
al. 2001). 
 
Success behind Korean (Samsung and LG.Philips) and Taiwanese (AUO, CMO, etc.) 
firms in this industry lies in the fact that they have aggressively adopted the metanational 
approach of learning technologies initially from Japan and adopting the global best-
supplier policy for equipment and materials, regardless of nationality (e.g. Samsung) 
(Murtha and Lenway 2006). 
   13
Japan initially adopted the metanational learning approach in the ’70s, when Sharp and 
Seiko learned TFT-LCD technology from RCA to develop their calculators and watches, 
respectively.  But as Japan became the center for this industry, the firms became more 
concerned about erosion of core technologies to other countries as opposed to renewing 
their knowledge through metanational learning.  Sharp’s “black box” approach is quite 
symbolic here, in that core technologies are generated, sourced, and leveraged in Japan. 
 
Such differing patterns can be interpreted by using table 2 presented above. The US case 
can be plotted in the lower-left quadrant, where national industry-specific and company-
specific technological advantages existed.  However, because of the lack of learning 
relationships in Asia, as well as the lack of sourcing equipment and materials from Japan, 
many US firms eventually failed in this industry. 
 
Japan’s case in the ’90s is similar to that of the US in the ’80s.  Japanese TFT-LCD 
companies enjoyed dominant power in the industry, with a market share as high as 95% 
in the early ’90s (see figure 1).  Japanese firms represented by Sharp can be plotted in the 
lower-left quadrant, where both the national industry- and company-specific 
technological advantages are strong.  However, due to the erosion of relative 
technological strengths vis-à-vis Korea (and Taiwan to some extent), the validity and 
sustainability of the black box approach is sometimes questioned by many critics and 
industry analysts. 
 
The Korean and Taiwanese cases can be plotted in the upper-right quadrant, where 
competitive advantages were missing both at the country and firm levels, at least in the 
beginning.  Korean and Taiwanese companies both adopted the lagging technology as a 
learning platform (Generation 2 for Korean and Generations 3 and 3.5 for Taiwanese) 
from Japan, and engaged in learning through a global best-supplier policy for equipment 
and materials, particularly Korean companies.  The metanational learning approach is 
characterized by the Korean and Taiwanese firms that sourced and leveraged knowledge 
from abroad and overcame both home-country industry disadvantage as well as firm-
specific disadvantage.  This type of situation is most typical for firms adopting the   14
metanational approach as they try to overcome the home-country disadvantages.   
Examples given by Doz et al. (2001), including ST Microelectronics and Nokia, are 
mostly those “born in the wrong place” yet which overcame such home-country 
weaknesses by way of learning though alliances and internationalization.  This type of 
learning typically takes the international-collaborative mode in the upper-right quadrant 
in table 2, as firms need to access knowledge from various parts of the globe through 
extensive formal and informal collaboration networks. 
 
However, recent evolution of the industry suggests that there is another variant of 
metanational learning for firms which were born in the right place in the beginning, yet 
the competitive advantage of their home base is rapidly eroding, as was the case for 
Japanese firms in the TFT-LCD industry.  We posit this type in the upper-right quadrant 
and label it as Type 2 metanational to differentiate it from the classical metanational 
proposed by Doz et al. (2001) which we labeled as Type 1 metanational.  Table 3 
illustrates the difference between Type 1 and Type 2 metanationals.
5 
 
I define Type 1 metanational as the “born-in-the-wrong-place firms” (i.e. firms which 
happen to be based in locations with comparative disadvantages) which resort to 
metanational learning in order to overcome home-country disadvantages.  I define Type II 
metanational as the firms which were initially born in the right place but which continue 
to engage in metanational learning with the recognition that their home-country 
advantage is eroding. 
 
 
--- insert table 3 about here --- 
                                                 
5 The Type 1 – Type 2 distinction is critical here, precisely because we emphasize that 
the relevance of the metanational approach goes beyond the typical Type 1 case in which 
born-in-the-wrong-place firms resort to metanational learning in order to overcome 
home-country disadvantages.  We argue that firms born in the right place at that time 
might run into a worse scenario when their home-country advantages erode.  In the latter 
case, adopting the metanational approach is often even more challenging than in the 
former, because of the inertia of overconfidence in the home-country environment and 
lack of capability for sensing new knowledge elsewhere.   15
 
From this point of view, metanational learning, whether type 1 or type 2, is relevant and 
yet it takes different forms depending on the following conditions: 1) home country’s 
industry competitiveness, and 2) competitiveness in company’s core technology.  Tables 
4a and 4b illustrate this argument. 
--- insert tables 4a and 4b about here --- 
 
When both 1) and 2) are weak, as represented by the lower-left quadrant, the firms 
obviously need to learn through international collaboration by stepping back to the old-
generation technology, as Korean and Taiwanese firms did in the early stage of 
development of TFT-LCD industry.  This is a typical case for born-in-the-wrong-place 
firms which adopt the metanational approach (Doz et al. 2001), or what I call Type I 
metanational. 
 
When both 1) and 2) are strong and sustainable, as represented by the upper-right 
quadrant, the firms can internalize advanced learning through vertical integration, often 
called the black box approach.  Alternatively, they can engage in advanced learning 
through arm's-length collaboration with domestic suppliers, without vertically-integrating 
them.  In reality, pure vertical integration is rare, even for Sharp which tried to extend its 
black box approach to the supplier relations by consolidating suppliers at the Kameyama 
plant (Nakata 2007).  Again, as long as the competitiveness at both levels remains strong 
and sustainable in the long run, the theoretical choice is a domestic, black box approach 
because of the availability of resources at home and because of the need for protecting 
core capability from outsiders.  But if the country’s industry competitiveness is eroded, 
domestic collaboration becomes less effective.  In such a case, the black box approach 
becomes less relevant.  I call this the relevance of the Type II metanational approach: to 
realize the limit of exclusive dependence on the home-country’s resources when the 
country’s industry competitiveness becomes weaker (see table 4b). 
----- insert table 4b about here ---- 
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When 1) is strong but 2) is weak, as represented by the upper-left quadrant, the firms 
need to learn through domestic collaboration.  While this type may at first glace 
contradict with the philosophy of metanational learning, it is natural for the firms to 
collaborate with their domestic partners from which they can leverage home-country 
advantage.  This holds true theoretically as long as the country’s industry competitiveness 
remains strong and sustained in the long run.  But if the country’s industry 
competitiveness is eroded, domestic collaboration becomes less effective.  In such a case, 
cross-border collaboration also needs to be considered.  Again, I see the relevance of the 
metanational II approach presented above (see table 4b). 
 
Lastly, when 2) is strong but 1) is weak, as represented by the lower-right quadrant, the 
firms need to learn through international collaboration in order to obtain advanced 
technology.  Firms in this position have absorptive capacity to tap into overseas hotbeds 
of innovation. This pattern is similar to the lower-left in terms of the need for learning 
through international collaboration.  In both cases, firms are born in the wrong place.  But 
firms with absorptive capacity can theoretically obtain more advanced technologies. 
 
 
5. Applying the Framework to the Reality: The Case of Japan 
 
 
5.1. Industry-specific advantages of Japan 
 
Japan’s competitive advantage in the TFT-LCD industry remains strong especially in 
technologically-sophisticated domains, but the production volume and market share of 
TFT-LCD panels have plummeted in the past decade, in the wake of fierce competition 
from Korean and Taiwanese firms (see figure 1). 
 
As for equipment and material makers, Japan remains competitive relative to Korea and 
Taiwan.  However, Korean companies like Samsung, in particular, cannot afford to rely 
on inefficient strategy for supplying equipment and materials from Japan. Samsung is   17
rapidly internalizing manufacturing of materials and equipment for TFT-LCD, as well as 
substituting certain technologies so as not to rely exclusively on Japanese suppliers.  For 
example, Samsung already internalized most of its procurements of core materials 
production within its group companies or its suppliers networks (Song 2006).  Up to G5, 
Samsung Electronics (SEC) internalized glass substrates, color filter, and driver IC; As 
for G7, SEC internalized backlight production.  SEC also constructed a glass substrate 
plant next to its own LCD plant.  As for LG.Philips and CMO, polarizer can be procured 
from within their own group companies.  The governments of Korea and Taiwan are 
trying to raise the percentage of internal procurement of materials and equipment (Korea: 
50% by 2005; Taiwan: 70% by 2008) (cf. Song 2006, Shintaku 2006). 
 
Under such a condition, Japanese materials and equipment makers cannot afford to 
simply supply their products only to Japanese panel manufacturers.  It becomes critically 
important for them to participate in Asian commercial and innovation networks in which 
more potential buyers exist in the growing local markets. 
--- insert table 5 about here --- 
 
Such a move substantially affects Japanese firms’ strategies.  Some firms are more 




5.2. Company-specific core technological advantages 
 
However, variance exists among companies and by categories in terms of the mode of 
collaboration, as shown in table 6. 
---- insert table 6 about here ----- 
 
Domestic/in-house is represented by Sharp, which originally adopted the domestic black 
box approach to core technology development.  This is consistent with the conceptual 
framework presented in section 4 above: the black box approach is most effective when   18
competitive advantages of a home country’s industry and company-specific core 
technology are all strong and enduring (see table 2).  However, this approach becomes 
vulnerable when any of these competitive advantages begins to erode.  Even Sharp is not 
an exception in that the company has gradually shifted its approach toward the more 
international/in-house type (Nakata 2007).
6  In any case, this approach is most effective 
when a company tries to buffer its technical core (i.e. its core technology) from 
competitors (cf. Thompson 1967), at least in the short term. But companies choose to 
partner with Taiwanese firms outside of their technological core, as seen in Sharp’s 
business alliance with Quanta Display (QDI) in Taiwan, to cope with low-cost 
competition
7 (Asakawa and Kim 2007:7).  In sum, the following pattern is common in 
this type: 1) core technological knowledge is contained within the firm and within Japan 
and; 2) peripheral or older-generation technologies are shared with its Asian subsidiaries
8 
or with the Taiwanese partners, mainly to cope with low-cost production pressure and to 
deter Korean dominance in the East Asian market.  And as the gap of national industrial 
competitiveness between Japan and Korea/Taiwan narrows, the pure black box approach 
becomes challenged by the Type-II metanational approach (see table 4b). 
 
Domestic/collaborative becomes more appropriate when the competitive advantages of 
home country and industry remain strong but that of the company becomes weak, 
according to the conceptual framework presented above.  Japanese panel makers other 
than Sharp stopped investing beyond 4G in the ’90s due to the economic recession and 
financial crisis in Japan.  As followers behind Sharp, they had good reason to collaborate 
among Japanese firms, given the remaining competitive advantage of Japan’s TFT-LCD 
industry, at least in the high end of the spectrum.  For example, when Matsushita and 
                                                 
6 Sharp’s plotted position (between domestic/in-house and international/in-house) in 
Table 6 signifies such a trend.  The author is grateful to a helpful comment by Professor 
Yukihiko Nakata on this point. 
7 Sharp adopted a differentiated approach to its outside parties depending on how core the 
technology is to the company.  For example, there was a policy that high-value-added 
TFT-LCD would be developed and manufactured internally whereas low-value-added 
would be externalized (Asakawa and Kim 2007:7).  Therefore, it is obviously a mistake 
to assume that Sharp adopts an exclusively domestic/in-house approach. 
8 This includes OEM from Taiwan, LCD module and LCD TV assembly in China, 
Malaysia, Mexico, and Poland, in the case of Sharp (Nakata 2007).   19
Toshiba announced that they would integrate their TFT-LCD businesses in October, 2001 
(Nikkei Shimbun, October 22, 2001), they were both suffering from low-price 
competition by Korean firms, and found it reasonable to integrate their TFT-LCD 
businesses to cope with the Korean rivalry (Asakawa and Kim 2007).
9  Another challenge 
manifests itself in the foundation of IPS Alpha Technology, Ltd.,
10 a  joint  venture 
between Hitachi, Matsushita, and Toshiba, along with Hitachi Displays Ltd., founded in 
January 1, 2005.  The aim of this new company is to develop, manufacture, and sell 
amorphous TFT-LCD panels larger than 23” TVs, with increased production capacity and 
reduced cost (Asakawa and Kim 2007).  The following pattern is common in these two 
examples: 1) these companies are behind major players such as Sharp and Samsung 
Electronics in terms of the generation race; 2) they are threatened by low-cost pressure by 
Korean rivals; 3) they have sophisticated technological niches; 4) they choose to form 
their domestic alliances to compete against Korean catch-up.  However, as the gap in 
national industrial competencies between Japan and Korea/Taiwan becomes narrower, 
pure domestic collaboration does not make sense.  In reality, it becomes increasingly 
unusual for firms to stick to pure domestic collaboration among materials and equipment 
makers, panel makers, and the end producers.  Here again, room for the Type-II 
metanational approach can be seen. 
 
International/collaborative, in turn, is represented by Sony, with its alliance with 
Samsung.  This paper's conceptual framework predicts that firms are likely to adopt this 
mode when the competitive advantages of a country’s industry and technological cores 
remain strong in general but the level is gradually eroding (i.e. Type 2 metanational).  
Sony, in spite of its competitiveness as a company, has been focused on CRT and thus 
lagged in TFT-LCD technologies.  It was relatively easy for Sony to go for international 
                                                 
9 The new company, TMD (Toshiba Matsushita Display Technology Ltd.) was founded 
in April 1, 2002, as 60% Toshiba and 40% Matsushita, in charge of development, 
manufacturing, and sales of TFT-LCD, STN-LCD, and Organic-EL for small- to 
medium- sized panels, aiming at cost-breakthrough by economy of scale (Asakawa and 
Kim 2007). 
10 IPS” stands for in-plane-switching, the technology for widening the view angle 
originally developed by Hitachi (Nikkei Shimbun, November 1, 2004; Asakawa and Kim 
2007).   20
collaboration in this case, because of the obvious technological shift from CRT to TFT-
LCD, and because of the obvious recognition that the company lagged behind Sharp in 
this technology.  However, it is understood that Sony did not form S-LCD, the joint 
venture company with Samsung Electronics in 2003 simply to learn state-of-the-art 
technology from Samsung.  Rather, the main purpose for Sony was to secure a stable 
supply of large TFT-LCD panels beyond Generation 7, which was believed to be much 
more cost-efficient than the earlier generations (Nikkei Shimbun, October 17, 2003; 
Asakawa and Kim 2007: 14).  In this sense, the S-LCD case does not entirely present a 
case to strongly support our earlier assumption that a firm which lags in a certain 
technological edge is likely to form an international collaboration to absorb advanced 
technologies.
11  Nevertheless, in broad terms, Sony took advantage of its collaboration 
with Samsung to overcome its weakness.  Many Japanese panel makers engaged in much 
looser inter-firm collaboration than vertical integration or joint ventures.  Typical 
examples include Japan’s TFT-LCD makers that transferred technology to Taiwanese 
firms for OEM manufacturing with cost advantage to deter fast-growing Korean makers.  
The case of technology transfer includes: from ADI (Mitsubishi Electrics) to CPT; from 
IBM Japan to ADT (founded by Acer); from Toshiba to Hannstar; from Sharp to Quanta 
Display; and from Matsushita to Unipac (Akabane 2005).  In sum, the following patterns 
are observed: 1) this type of collaboration takes place in different ranges of inter-firm 
arrangements: ranging from joint ventures to OEM manufacturing
12;  2) The objective of 
the collaboration also varies, but more for cost and efficiency reasons than pure learning. 
 
 
5.3. Collaboration by equipment and materials makers 
 
                                                 
11 In fact, it was Samsung Electronics which tried to catch up with the Japanese 
competitors through vertical integration or collaboration with the best equipment and 
materials makers from Japan and elsewhere (Song 2007).  
12 As for the learning mode, the following spectrum was proposed by Ford (1988): 
internal R&D, joint venture, contracted-out R&D, license-in, and non-acquisition (i.e. 
buying final product) (Nakata 2007).   21
Collaboration between materials/equipment makers and panel makers can be classified as 
vertical (as opposed to horizontal, among the panel makers), as illustrated in table 5.   
--- insert table 5 about here --- 
Materials and equipment companies, no matter how competent they may be, cannot 
survive without collaborating with the panel makers as buyers.  Therefore, a pure in-
house approach does not make sense.  The co-location approach by Dai Nippon (DNP) in 
Kameyama is symbolic: DNP brought in its color filter manufacturing technology to 
collaborate with Sharp and to start joint production from 2006. 
 
At the same time, equipment and materials makers cannot afford to ignore their overseas 
customers in Korea and Taiwan, although the government wishes to protect the core 
technologies from leaking to Korea and Taiwan.  Many firms engage in collaboration 
with Korean makers.  Led by the strong leadership of top management, some firms adopt 
an aggressive approach of engaging in international collaboration without being a 
member of Future Vision, a national project. The international-collaborative strategy is a 
high-risk, high-return approach because it may run into intellectual property right (IPR) 
risks.  Nevertheless, Japan’s equipment makers are inclined to collaborate with Korean 
and Taiwanese firms due to their large volume of production.  It was reported that 
international joint research and development (R&D) consists of 70% for Japan’s 
equipment makers; domestic joint R&D consists of 30% (Shintaku 2006).  For example, 
70% of CMO’s R&D is conducted jointly with Japan’s materials and equipment makers, 




6.  Conclusion and Implications 
 
Japan’s dominance in TFT-LCD production volume and market share in the ’90s has 
been replaced by that of Korea and Taiwan (see figure 1).  While Japan’s strengths lie in 
production technologies, and materials and equipment manufacturing, the gap between 
Japan and Korea/Taiwan is shrinking.  For example, Japan’s strength, among others, lies   22
in ramping up building large-scale, multiple lines rapidly, which Japanese firms need to 
keep upgraded. 
 
Korea is open in absorbing knowledge and technology from Japan, and yet very closed in 
disclosing to outsiders; Samsung Electronics has a reputation of initially being very open 
in terms of knowledge in-flow; but over time it gradually gets closed in a very subtle way 
once it develops its capability internally – then it becomes reluctant to open up.
13  The 
same can be said about Taiwan, which is famous for open-sourcing by networking.  But 
once the firms acquire capability from Japan, they try to be very careful about preserving 
their proprietary knowledge when transferring technologies to China.  Balancing 
openness and closure is an important issue for Japanese companies as well. 
 
Implications for Japanese companies and public policy follow: 
 
If we look back, we recall a sad case of a U.S. government program which caused 
companies to turn inward to other U.S. companies instead of reaching outward to 
collaborate in Japan in 1990s, leading to further deterioration of U.S. industry (Murtha et 
al. 2001). 
 
But Japan faces a similar dilemma today – to close off global collaboration, or to try to 
stem the tide of disinvestment and technology diffusion, particularly to China.  Or it can 
recommit to the collaborative norms that made it the birthplace of high-volume industry, 
and the dominant player through the mid-1990s. 
 
The following alternative strategies exist: 
 
Close off knowledge flows via equipment and materials:  Hold back or delay sales of 
leading-generation equipment and materials outside of Japan.  However, such a move 
                                                 
13 For example, Samsung Electronics might have been much more metanational in its 
semiconductor business in the ’80s than in its TFT-LCD business of today, because of its 
gained competence and its orientation toward internalization.   23
may be too late, because Taiwanese have already bought lagging generation tools and 
equipment.  What would such a strategy do to Japanese equipment, materials, and 
component suppliers?  Restrictions or obstacles to equipment export, even if permissible 
under international trade agreements, would only hasten efforts in Korea and Taiwan to 
try to further articulate their own supply chains by establishing new firms or encouraging 
producers to integrate backwards.  Merely buying equipment and materials is not an 
adequate strategy for technology leadership in this industry anyway because 1) unlike 
semiconductors, there’s no roadmap, and 2) knowledge is not entirely embodied, or it is 
to a far lesser degree than in semiconductors, especially in advanced-generation 
equipment and materials. 
 
Vertical integration at firm level:  This is an expensive solution, and Japanese firms have 
already shown reluctance to make the large commitments necessary to remain the leading 
players in both capacity planning and generational advance.  Furthermore, it would be 
very difficult, as well as expensive, for producers to replicate the large body of 
specialized industry knowledge that equipment and materials suppliers have gained by 
working together with them.  As equipment and materials suppliers are unlikely to want 
to sell themselves, producers wishing to integrate will need to start from scratch.  Korean 
producers and the Korean government face a similar set of dilemmas, as they would like 
to alter the balance of trade in equipment and materials in this industry.   
 
Collaborate, but only in Japan:  This approach would remain valid as long as Japan’s 
competitive advantage in the industry remains strong in the long run, relative to other 
countries.  However, reality shows otherwise: Korean and Taiwanese firms rapidly catch 
up to their Japanese counterparts through aggressive procurements of materials and 
equipment and through internalization of upstream sectors.  Domestic collaboration 
might become vulnerable as Japan’s relative strength erodes. 
 
Global collaboration: From the perspective of metanational learning, this is obviously the 
goal.  However, unlike Korea and Taiwan, Japan may end up playing the teacher’s role 
rather than learning from the partners.  Japan therefore should identify which   24
technologies to learn from abroad and it should stay focused.  Otherwise, Japanese firms 
may end up losing more than they gain from the collaborating partners.  In spite of 
potential risk, the metanational (here the Type-II) approach remains appropriate for the 
firms which need to cope with eroding country and industry competitiveness, such as the 
Japanese firms in the TFT-LCD industry.  
 
While Japan remains strong in many technological domains, there are growing areas in 
which Korea – and Taiwan to some extent – are rapidly catching up.  Under such a 
circumstance, it seems appropriate for Japanese firms to identify which technological 
domains need to be Japan-based and which need to be cross-national.  The real challenge 
lies in the fact that even a country’s dominance in one area is not stable in the long run.  
Japan’s dominance in any technological area cannot be guaranteed in the near future.  
The essence of the Type-II metanational approach is to highlight the importance of 
recognizing the potential risk of being complacent for today’s home-country advantage 
and of opening up the mindset for global learning, even though the current home-country 
advantage still remains.  While this paper is focused on the TFT-LCD industry, the 
framework presented here can be applied to other industries in which metanational 
learning remains crucial. 
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Table 2 
Selection of collaborative mode contingent on competencies of home 
country’s industry and company’s core technology 
 
 
































This table illustrates the way competency levels of the home-country industry and 
a company’s core technology would influence a company’s selection of  a 




When the competency levels of the country’s industry and the company’s core 
technology are weak (-), the company is more likely to adopt the “international-
collaborative” approach to learn from abroad. 
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Table 3 
Revised Framework: Type 2 Added 
 







































This revised framework presents two types of conditions under which 
international-collaborative mode of learning is more likely to take place.  Besides 
“Type 1,” “Type 2” is added here.  Please read the +and – signs as follows: 
 
Type 2: 
Industry + - : The country’s industry is basically strong (+) and yet is gradually 
declining in competitiveness (-). 
Company + - : The company’s core technology is basically strong (+) and yet is 
gradually declining in competitiveness (-).   31
Table 4a:  
Differing modes and objectives of learning, contingent on country’s industry 
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Table 4b 
Different approaches, contingent on country’s industry competitiveness and 
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Table 5 
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